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STATE OF UTAH
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)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent, )
)
)

-vsFASHION PLACE ASSOCIATES,
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~

)
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)
)

* * * * * *** **
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

* ** * * **** ****
NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent's (hereafter Fashions Four) brief
description of the nature of the case is misleading in
light of their four count complaint, which pled equitable
and injunctive causes of action, breach of the lease
agreement, and violation of Section 78-36-2, U.C.A. (1953)
as amended. (R. 2-6).
DISPOSITION IN LOWEF. COURT
Four's review of the disposition in the

v~~t-.:
___
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lower court is substantially correct; however, it should
be noted that the finding seized upon by Fashions Four is
but one of 22 separate findings made by the lower court.
(R.

199-204) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, (hereafter Fashion Place) disputes

Fashions Four's version of the facts in a number of areas.
For purposes of clarity, factual disputes are discussed
in the context of the specific legal issues raised by the
allegations.

Statutory citations

are to the Utah Code

Annotated as amended.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT BEING APPEALED DOES NOT ARISE
FROM STATUTORY FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
WITH THE RESULT THAT THE TIME FOR APPEAL
IS NOT CONTROLLED BY SECTION 78-36-11.
Fashions Four asserts that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal on the grounds th.at Fashion Place
did not file a notice of appeal within 10 days within the
entry of judgment.

Fashions Four's argument rests on

Section 78-36-11:
"78-36-11. Time for appeal. --Either party may.
within 10 days, appeal from the judgment rendered."

. 2.
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Fashions Four's contention is totally without
merit for the simple reason that the judgment appealed
from does not arise under Section 78-36-2, the statutory
provision relating to forcible entry and detainer.
First, the complaint filed by Fashions Four pled
at least four causes of action, only one of which alleged
a breach of Section 78-36-2.

Second, the action lacks

the essential identifying characteristic of forcible entry
and detainer actions as determined by previous decisions
of this Court.

Third, the judgment under review does

not contain the critical element of relief which the
forcible entry and detainer statute mandates must be
present in judgments arising under the statute.

Finally,

the judgment contains elements of relief that are clearly
impermissible under the forcible entry and detainer
statute.
At the outset, it should be noted that Plaintiff's
four count complaint pled equitable and injunctive causes
of action, breach of contract, and a claim for forcible
entry and detainer.

The findings of fact, conclusions

of law and judgment entered herein make no specific reference
to the counts pled.

Thus it is not clear from which count(s)

the judgment arose.

. 3.
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This Court has previously held that a plaintiff
must comply with the provisions of Section 78-36-8
in order to avail itself of the forcible entry and detainer
statute.

That section requires that the Court endorse

upon the summons the number of days within which the
defendant shall be required to appear and defend the
action which shall not be. less than three days or more
than 20 days from the date of service.

Gerard vs. Young,

20 Ut.2d 30, 432 P. 2d 343 (1967), is the controlling
case.

On appeal, the lessor contended that it was

error for the trial court not to award the lessor treble
damages under the forcible entry and detainer statute.
This Court affirmed, stating:
"In the first place, for a plaintiff to
bring his case under the forcible entry and
detainer statute, he must have the Court
endorse upon the summons the number of days
within which the defendant shall be required
fo appear and defend the action, which shall
be not less than three or more than 20 days
from date of service." (Emphasis added).
(Section 78-36-8) id. at 348.
Gerard stands for the proposition that compliance
with Section 78-36-8 is an essential element of any
action genuinely arising under the forcible entry and
detainer statute.

Subsequent decisions have affirmed

Gerard and held that compliance with Section 78-36-8 is
determinative in deciding in whether an action arises

.4.
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under the forcible entry and detainer statute.

Vickery vs.

Kiser, 556 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976); Pingree vs. Continental
Group of Utah Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976).
It is undisputed that Fashions Four failed to
comply with the shortening of time provision of Section
78-36-8.

(R. 42).

Having failed to comply with that

provision, Fashions Four's judgment does not arise under
the forcible entry and detainer statute, thus precluding
application of the 10 day time limit for filing the notice
of appeal.

Fashions Four, having itself failed to strictly

comply with the statute, should not be allowed to use
the same statute to defeat Fashion Place's constitutionally
recognized right of appeal.
In addition to compliance with Section 78-36-8,
another test exists for determining if a particular judgment
is controlled by Section 78-36-11.

The elements of a

judgment arising under the forcible entry and detainer
statute are controlled by a specific statutory section,
Section 78-36-10.

A judgment arising under the statute

must contain the elements of relief specified in Section
78-36-10, the relevant part of which reads:
"78-36-10. Judgment -- of restitution; for damages
and rent. -- If upon the trial the verdict of
the jury, or if the case is tried without a
jury, the finding of the Court, is in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defen~ant?
jud~ent shall be ente~ed for ~he restitution
Oft e premises; . . . (Emphasis added)
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The emphasis of the entire forcible entry and
-detainer action, including Section 78-36-10 is on
restitution, putting a dispossessed tenant back into
possession.

78-36-10 mandates that a judgment in favor

of a plaintiff award restitution.

A judgment not awarding

restitution falls outside the parameters of the statute
according to previous decisions of this Court.

Belnap vs. Fox

251 P. 1073 (Utah 1927) is the controlling case in this
jurisdiction.

In that action the Court noted that the

defendant had surrendered possession of the premises
in issue to the plaintiff prior to trial.

The opinion

holds that because restitution of the premises was not
an issue at trial, the 10 day appeal filing period was not
applicable, and the time for appeal was in fact controlled
by the general appeal statute.
The judgment obtained in the instant action does
not award restitution of the premises to plaintiff.

(R: 207-2(

Restitution was not ordered because Fashions Four had been
in actual possession of the premises for more than two months
prior to trial and for more than four months prior to the
entry of judgment.

(R. 201, Finding 13).

The issue of

restitution Has thus moot at the time of trial and entry
of judgment.

Under Belnap, the omission of restitution

from the judgment

places that judgment outside the class

of statutory judgments controlled by the shortened notice
of appeal provisions.

Belnap stands for the principle that
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fairness is best served by requiring that both parties
meet the same standard of strict statutory compliance
before applying the special appeal provisions of Section
78-36-11.

That conclusion is further supported by the

fact that the judgment below includes elements of relief
clearly impermissible under Section 78-36-10.
In addition to money damages, the lower court's
judgment awarded Fashions Four injunctive relief, in the
form of a permanent injunction prohibiting Fashion Place
from interfering with their occupancy and possession of
the premises in dispute, and declaratory relief in the
form of a finding that Plaintiff was entitled to possession
under the terms of the original lease agreement.

(R. 208).

The relief thus awarded appears to be equitable
and declaratory in nature.

Both elements are legitimate

items of relief under the U.R.C.P., but judgments arising
I'.

under the Utah.Forcible Entry and Detainer Act are controlled

1'

by Section 78-36-10.

The full text of Section 78-36-10

is attached hereto as Appendix A.

A review of Section 78-36-10

reveals no provision for the award of general equitable or
declaratory relief in statutory actions.

Thus, the judgment

awarded Fashions Four could not arise under the forcible
entry and detainer statute, and thus the shortened time for
appeal provisions do not apply .

. 7.
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The controlling case in this jurisdiction is
Ottenheimer vs. Mountain States Supply Co.,
188 P. 1117 (1920).

55 Ut. 190,

The applicability of the shortened

time provision of Section 78-36-11 was the issue before
the Court.

The Court held that the shortened time

provisions did not apply, stating that the relief sought
and obtained by the plaintiffs under their second cause
of action was purely equitable, and could not be obtained
in a forcible entry and detainer under the statute.
Ottenheimer was affirmed by this Court in Brandley vs. Lewis,
92 P.2d 338, (Utah 1939).
In summary, the action pursued by the Plaintiff
and the judgment in fact obtained failed in every important
respect to contain the prerequisite elements of statutory
forcible entry or detainer cases.

First, the complaint

itself pled four causes of action, only one of which involved
the statutory claim.

Second, the Plaintiff failed to

comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 78-36-8
in regard to shortening the time to appear and defend
forcible entry and/or detainer actions.
Third, the judgment itself as entered lacks an
essential element which the statute itself mandates must
be present in any judgment arising under the statute,
restition of the premises.

Finally, the relief in fact

obtained could not be properly awarded under the provisions
o f the s ta tut e .
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These deficiencies put the judgment under appeal
clearly outside the statutory parameters of forcible
entry and detainer actions, and thus outside the application
of Section 78-36-11 as regards the shortened time for
appeal.

The assertion of jurisdiction by this Court over

this appeal is entirely consistent with prior Utah case law.
POINT II
THE JUNE 11 REASSIGNMENT OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT
FROM NORSAL TO FASHIONS FOUR IS VOID BECAUSE
THE CONSENT OF THE LESSOR AS REQUIRED BY THE
LEASE WAS NOT OBTAINED. THE LOWER COURT ERRED
IN FINDING THAT CONSENT WAS NOT REQUIRED AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
On June 11, 1981 Norsal reassigned the lease
agreement to the prior tenant, Fashions Four.
Finding Nos. 12 and 13).

(R.201,

That reassignment was made

without the knowledge or consent of Fashion Place, (R. 204,
Conclusion No. 2), in apparent violation of Article 15 of
the lease agreement, which requires lessor's consent to
any assignment.

(R. 20).

The crux of the lower court decision is the
conclusion that the consent of the lessor, Fashion Place,
was not required for the June 11 reassignment.
Conclusion No. 3).

(R. 204,

The finding that Fashions Four had

a possessory interest in the lease which was violated by

. 9.
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Fashion Place (R. 201, Finding Nos. 12 and 13), rests
entirely on the validity of the reassignment.
The trial court's conclusion that Fashion Place's
consent was not required as a matter of law is derived
from a line of three cases apparently holding that the
consent provisions of written lease agreements do not
apply to reassignments to an original lessee.

The first

case in that series is McCormick vs. Stowell, 138 Mass. 431
(Mass. 1885).
At the outset, it should be noted that McCormick
did not involve a dispute over possession.

In :McCormick,

the lessee brought an action against the lessor based
on a claim that the lessor had failed to heat the
premises as agreed.

The lessor raised the claim of an

assignment without consent as an affirmative defense
barring the introduction of evidence that would support
the lessee's claim that the lessor had failed to heat
the premises.
The opinion holds that it was proper for the
trial court to allow evidence regarding the lessor's failure
to heat the premises.

In arriving at that holding, the

Massachusetts court noted that the assignment back was
not a breach, because lease provisions requiring the
written consent of the lessor for assignment do not apply
to a reassignment to the lessee .
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The source then of Fashions Four's contention that
the consent to assignment provisions of written lease agreements do not apply to reassignments to an original lessee
lies in the unsupported dicta of an 1885 Massachusetts'
action which did not raise the issue of possession.
The McCormick dicta was repeated with approval 6~- years
later in the next case relied upon by Plaintiff, Coulas vs.
Desimone, 208 P. 2d 105 (Wash. 1949).

Again, it should

be noted at the outset that Coulos does not raise an issue
of possession.
Coulos was an action for money damages arising out
of a claim of constructive eviction brought by the original
lessee, Coulos, against the lessor's predecessor in interest,
Desimone.

Desimone raised the issue of a reassignment without

consent as an affirmative defense to the constructive eviction
claim.

The Washington court, relying on McCormick,

held

that the reassignment was not a defense to the constructive
eviction claim.
The final case in this series relied upon by Plaintiff
is Shoemaker vs. Shaug, 490 P.2d 439 (Wash. App. 1971).
like McCormick and Coulos,
possession issue.

Un-

Shoemaker does involve a

Shoemaker, an assignee of the original

lessee, bought the action seeking to avoid a termination of
the lease by lessor Shaug on the grounds that there had been
an assignment without the lessor's consent.

Specifically,
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Shoemaker as part of an anticipated sale of the business
operated on the leasehold premises, had assigned the lease
to a corporation created by himself and the proposed
purchaser.

When the purchase fell through, Shoemaker

had the corporation reassign the lease back to himself.
Lessor Shaug sought to terminate the lease on the
grounds that there had been as assignment without the lessor's
consent as required by the lease agreement.

The trial

court, with substantial misgivings as noted in the opinion,
declared a forfeiture and terminated the lease.
The appellate court reversed, pointing out that
forfeitures are not favored as a matter of law, and that
equity will step in to prevent an inequitable forfeiture.
The court sites McCormick and Coulas in support of those
general propositions.

Because neither Coulas nor McCormick

involved a possession dispute, the Court's reliance
on those two cases seems misplaced.
In addition to the analytical weaknesses of the
cases described above, those cases are readily distinguishable
from the facts before this Court.

First and most important,

the right to possession, which is the gravamen of this
litigation, was simply not at issue in McCormick nor Coulas.
Second, the instant action involves premises located
in a large regional shopping center where the lessor has
contractual relationships with a large number of tenants, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is obligated to operate the entire facility in such a way
as to provide the maximum benefit to all tenants.

In contrast,

all of Fashions Four's cases involve simple bilateral relationships between a single lessor and a single lessee.
The primary issue in the instant action is whether
the explicit la~guage of Article 15 of the lease agreement
will be enforced.

That clause states in part:

"Any attempted transfer, assignment, subletting,
license or concession agreement, change of
ownership or hypothecation without the landlord's written consent shall be void and
confer no rights upon any third person.
"
(R. 20).
The contract language could hardly be more
straightforward.

Applied to the facts of the instant

action, it simply means that Norsal's June 11 reassignment
of the lease agreement to Fashions Four, the lynchpin of
Fashions Four's entire case, fails to transfer any rights,
possessory or otherwise, back to Fashions Four because the
consent of the landlord to the assignment was not obtained.
As indicated in Appellant's Brief on Appeal, freely
negotiated contracts between sophisticated commercial
parties should not be ignored or set aside, absent fraud
or unconscionability, neither of which are present in this
action.

Fashions Four has simply argued that because the

contract does not meet their needs after the fact, it must
be modified by Court fiat.

In support of that contention,

Fashions Four relies upon case law that is analytically
defective. in contravention of good public policy, and
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""'

distinguishable from the case herein.

POINT III
FASHION PLACE DID NOT WAIVE THE APPLICATION OF
THE CONSENT TO ASSIGNMENT PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE
15 AS REGARDS THE JUNE 11 REASSIGNMENT.
Fashions Four contends that as regards the June 11
reassignment back to Fashions Four, Fashion Place waived
application of the consent to assignment provisions of
Article 15 because those provisions were not followed in two
earlier transactions involving the lease.

That contention

is without merit.
Assuming arguendo that the consent provisions were
actually not followed in the earlier transactions, no
waiver would result under the express provisions of
Article 22 of the lease agreement, the last paragraph
of which reads as follows:
"The waiver by landlord of any breach of any
terin, covenant or condition herein contained
shall not be deemed to be a waiver of such
term, covenant or condition or of any subsequent
breach of the same or any other term, covenant
or condition herein contained. The subseouent
acceptance of rent hereunder by landlord shall
not be deemed to be waiver of any preceding
breach by tenant of any term, covenant or
condition of this lease, other than the failure
of tenant to pay the particular rentals so
accepted, regardless of landlord's knowledge of
such preceding breach at the time of acceptance
of such rent. No covenant, term, or condition
of this lease shall be deemed to have been waived
by landlord, unless such waiver be in writing by
landlord. " (R. 30) .
In support of its waiver arguments, Fashions Four
cites Hendrickson vs. Freericks, 620 P.2d 205, (Alaska 1980).
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In fact, that case supports Fashion Place's contention that
no waiver occurred.

In that case, the Alaska court rejects

a claim of waiver as to a particular assignment in the
following language:
"Although we have found that Hendrickson did
give notice of his intent to enforce the terms
of the lease, this principle need not be applied
in the instant case to support our holding.
In Stevens vs. State, 501 P. 2d 759, 762 (Alaska
1972}, we held that where a lease contains a
non-waiver provision, previous failures to
cancel for a breach of a covenant do not
constitute a waiver, and the landlord may
demand strict compliance with a lease
provision without giving such prior notice.
The Hall-Young lease contains such a nonwaiver clause which provided that 'waiver by
lessor of any breach of any term, covenant
or condition . . . shall not be deemed to be
a waiver of such tenn.' Hendrickson 211 footnote
6 •II
In view of the non-waiver clause cited above, it
appears certain that the Alaska court would have enforced the
contract language, which is exactly what Fashion Place
contends the Court should do in the instant action.
It should also be noted that Fashions Four
concedes in its brief that no waiver arises where a lessor
puts an assignee on notice that strict compliance will be
required.
At trial, it was the undisputed testimony of Mr.
Elgin Williams, Plaintiff and chief executive officer of
Fashions Four, that in April of 1981 he met with Tom Estes,

.15.
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the general manager of Fashion Place Mall, and was told
·that in order for Fashions Four to regain possession of the
premises, a new lease would have

~o

be renegotiated.

(T. 40).

Thus, Fashions Four had actual notice that the landlord
would demand strict compliance with the lease provisions.
The transactions out of which the alleged waivers
arise, also deserve brief examination.

The first

transfer was the assignment from Fashions Four to Norsal
in 1978.

As indicated in the findings on file herein,

Fashion Place in fact consented to that assignment.
Finding No. 9).

(R.200,

A waiver will not arise from the undisputed

exercise of the consent requirement.
Fashions Four also claims that a waiver arose from
a second transfer in November of 1979, at which time all
the stock of Norsal Development Corporation was sold to
Neil Davidson.

Fashion Place was given no notice whatsoever

of that transaction at the time it occurred.

Fashion

Place could not waive its right to consent to that transaction
where it had no notice of the transfer and no opportunity
to exercise its right to consent.
Fashions Four's contention that Fashion Place
waived its right to consent to the June 11 reassignment
will simply not stand where the written lease itself contains
an explicit non-waiver provision; where Fashions Four had
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actual notice that the landlord would require strict
compliance; and where the transaction supposedly raising
the waiver were either consented to by Fashion Place, or
kept from Fashion Place's knowledge.

CONCLUSION
In summary, the trial court erred in failing to
apply and enforce the clear language of the lease agreement
requiring the lessor's consent to any assignment of the
lease.

For that reason, Fashion Place respectfully

requests that the trial court judgment be reversed, the
case remanded, and that the trial court be directed to
enter judgment in favor of Fashion Place, and to hold
further proceedings on the amount of damages sustained by
Fashion Place under its counterclaim .
...--

DATED this

day of November, 1982.

GREEN, HIGGINS & BERRY

Raymond Scott Berry\
Attorney for Appeflant
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APPENDIX A
"78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages and
rent -- Inrrnediate enforcement. If upon the trial
the verdict of the jury, or if the case is tried
without a jury, the finding of the court, is in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
judgment shall be entered for the restitution of
the premises; andif the proceeding is for unlawful
detainer after neglect or failure to perform any
condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under
which the property is held, or after default in the
payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the
forfeiture of the lease or agreement. The jury, or
the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury,
shall also assess the damages occasioned to the
plaintiff by any forcible entry, or by any
forcible or unlawful detainer, and any amount found
due the plaintiff by reason of waste of the premises
by the defendant during the tenancy, alleged in the
complaint and proved on the trial, and find the
amount of any rent due, if the alleged unlawful
detainer is after default in the payment of rent;
and the judgment shall be rendered against the
defendant guilty of the forcible entry, or forcible
or unlawful detainer, for the rent and for three
times the amount of the damages thus assessed.
When the proceeding is for an unlawful detainer after
default in the payment of the rent, execution upon the
judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry
of the judgment. In all cases the judgment may. be
enforced immediately."
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